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This "establishment of religion" clause has received the
Supreme Court's attention primarily with respect to education
problems. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding tax expenditures for transportation of children to parochial
schools constitutional); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (religious teaching in public schools
violated First Amendment as made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth); Zorbach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (approving
"released time" system of New York City schools). The clause has
been considered with respect to other subjects in lower federal
courts, where it has been held not violated by exempting from
combatant military service the members of religious sects whose
tenets exclude the moral right to engage in war, Roodenko v.
United States, 147 F.2d 752 (10th Cir. 1947), and the refusal of a
Jehovah's Witness to serve on a jury is justified by this Amendment.
United States v. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Wash. 1943).
Whether or not the Supreme Court will generalize its attitude
in the school cases in such a manner as to affect adoption statutes
of this sort is the important question which awaits an answer when
the Court is presented with a case which it is willing to dispose of
on the merits.
E. W. C.

CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs-FLuominATION OF WATER SUPPLIES.-D appeals from a decree enjoining it

from fluoridating its municipal water supply. P, a taxpayer, brought
suit for the injunction. Held, that fluoridation of the water supply
in a valid exercise of the police power, having a reasonable relationship to the public health or general welfare. Chapman v. City
of Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 74 So.2d 142 (1954).
Fluoridation of water, one part to one million parts. water,
has the effect of reducing dental caries, the major cause of tooth
decay, by building up the enamel of the teeth. It affects only
children under twelve years of age. It is highly recommended by
dental and medical societies and by the West Virginia Board of
Health.
In Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 417, 121 N.E.2d
311 (1954), and De Aryan v. Butler, 119 Cal.App.2d 674, 260 P.2d
98 (1953), the same problem is presented with results in accord
with the principal case. In each case, the action of the municipality
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was attacked on the grounds of violation of the Constitution of
the United States and lack of municipal authority.
As to the constitutional argument, it is everywhere conceded
that the preservation of its people's health falls within the police
power of the state. Grosso v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 70, 21
S.E.2d 728 (1942), citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114
(1889), in which the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed
a holding of the West Virginia supreme court.
There is a complication here, however, in that fluoridation of
water directly affects only children under twelve years of age. But,
the courts have held that measures designed to preserve and promote the health of children are for the public welfare generally,
Bissell v. Davidson, 65 Conn. 183, 32 Atd. 348 (1894) (vaccination
of school children). Furthermore, as indicated in the principal
case, the children, when they mature, will carry the benefit into
their adult life, so it is only those citizens of the city who are above
the age affected when the plan is adopted who will receive no
benefit directly. This is not a violation of the "equal protection"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U.S. 618 (1904);
Hansen v. Raleigh, 391 Ill. 536, 63 N.E.2d 851 (1945). Furthermore,
"... the United States Supreme Court, in establishing and clarifying the Constitutional right of religious and other freedoms, has
distinguished between direct compulsion imposed upon individuals,
with penalities for violations, and those which are indirect or
reasonably incidental to a furnished service or facility." De Aryan
v. Butler, supra, at 683, 260 P.2d at 103, citing Hamilton v. Regents
of University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); and
Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
In Hayes v. Town of Cedar Grove, 126 W. Va. 828, 30 S.E.2d
726 (1944), the court said that the power of the state to provide
for the health of its people has been stressed as one which may
be given the broadest application and exercised in keeping with
advances in science. The courts require only that reasonable
methods are employed and natural and constitutional rights of
citizens are not invaded.
Thus, the state would probably have the authority to enact
such legislation as that presented, since it would not seem to
violate any constitutional restrictions. Therefore, the question
resolves itself into an inquiry of the authority of the municipalities
to enact fluoridation ordinances in the absence of specific legisla-
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tion. The court in Hayes v. Town of Cedar Grove, supra, in discussing W. VA. CODE c. 8, art. 4, § 10 (Michie, 1949), which gave
the council of a municipal corporation the general power, among
others, to enact, authorize or prohibit a water works and maintain a healthful water supply, stated that it delegated to municipalities power to take all measures necessary to protect the health of its
residents. Every intendment is to be made in favor of the lawfulness of the exercise of municipal power making regulations to promote the public health and safety, and it is not the province of the
courts, except in clear cases, to interfere with the power imposed by
by law in municipal corporations for the protection of local rights
and the health and welfare of the people of the community. Stark
ex rel. Oil Service Co. v. Stark, 96 W. Va. 176, 122 S.E. 533 (1924);
and see, to the same effect, Gorieb v. Fox, 145 Va. 554, 134 S.E. 914
(1926), aff'd, 274 U.S. 603 (1927). In Board of Supervisors of
Nansemond County v. City of Norfolk, 153 Va. 768, 775, 151 S.E.
142, 145 (1930), the court said: "A city not only has the right to
It is the settled
protect its water supply, but it must protect it ....
policy of the state and of all states to encourage any reasonable
exercise of this right and power."
Considering the ease with which the courts in the three cases
directly concerned With fluoridation disposed of the arguments in
opposition to the city's actiori and the broad powers, in the field
of public health, conferred on West Virginia's municipal corporations by statute as construed by the court, there seems to be little
question but that fluoridation of water by municipalities will be
upheld.
However, the implication which arises therefrom is not so
easily disposed of. Where will this type of ordinance lead us?
Prior to the enactment of fluoridation ordinances, health measures
of a similar nature did not have the effect of adding something
to the water, milk, or other products which is beneficial to the
human body, but rather of removing something which would be
harmful. Chlorination of water is done to "remove" harmful
bacteria. Pasteurization and vaccination have much the same
function. But here, we have something which has its effect in
adding something to the water, removing nothing, in order that
dental caries, producers of decay, cannot operate as effectively on
the teeth. This is held a valid exercise of the police power because
it has reasonable relation to public power. But now, what else
can be added to the water supply as beneficial to public health?
The implications are vast. Are we opening a new door in public
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health measures by allowing the use of water supplies as the means
for the addition of beneficial substances to the body? Is the next
step the addition of vitamins or poliomyelitis vaccine? And then
what? Whether they realize it or not, apparently the courts in
these decisions have found that the police power of municipalities
is broader in scope than was previously realized.
H. R. A., Jr.

CONTRACTS-COLLETIVE

BARGAINING-CONSIDERATION

FOR

employees
of D pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement providing for
vacation pay, accumulated sick leave, and retirement benefits. The
agreement also provided that, if D's properties were ever sold, said
agreement and its benefits would terminate. D proposed to sell
the company, and orally promised Ps that if the sale were consummated, it would pay to them the cash equivalent of said benefits
which had accrued up to the date of the sale. Ps continued working
for D, at regular wages, until the sale was made, and they were
continued in their same employment by D's purchaser. Ps sue to
recover the promised cash value of the accumulated sick leave and
retirement benefits which D had refused to pay. Held, that D's
promise was unenforceable because unsupported by consideration.
Nor would the doctrine of promissory estoppel apply, for justice
here did not require that D's promise be enforced. The dissent
maintained that there was consideration in Ps' acceptance of the
promise in settlement of their rights under the agreement; in their
continued service and implied promise not to seek other means of
protecting their rights. Byerly v. Duke Power Co., 217 F.2d 803
(4th Cir. 1954).
It is a well settled rule of law, with certain well defined exceptions, that a consideration is an essential element of a simple contract, and hence a promise is binding only if consideration is given
in exchange for it. Peoples Bldg. & Loan Assn v. Swaim, 198 N.C.
14, 150 S.E. 668 (1929) ; Thomas v. Mott, 74 W. Va. 498, 82 S.E. 325
(1914). A consideration is an act or forbearance, or the creation,
modification, or destruction of a legal relation, or a return promise,
bargained for and given in exchange for the promise. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS § 75 (1933), cited with approval in principal
case. A consideration may involve either a legal detriment to
the promisee or a legal benefit to the promisor. Fawcett v. Fawcett,
PROMISE TO PAY CASH EQUIVALENT OF BENEFITS.-Ps were
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